A Fireball on ASEAN’s Lap (Part 2) – by Theo Zaw
A Fireball on ASEAN’s Lap (Part 2) – by Theo Zaw
MoeMaKa, May 19, 2025
Based on findings from top U.S. investigative agencies, it appears increasingly evident that Myanmar’s defense minister’s statement at the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue—claiming the country had ceased nuclear ambitions—may have been untrue. The recovered weapons-grade plutonium is a key piece of evidence disproving those past claims. This strongly suggests that Myanmar not only misled the international community, including ASEAN and the IAEA, but also violated nonproliferation norms. This matter now demands greater scrutiny and transparency.
Myanmar has been a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since its founding in 1957 and remains a continuous member. In contrast, North Korea joined in 1974 but withdrew in 1994. So, Myanmar cannot disregard IAEA standards in the same way North Korea has.
Myanmar ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on December 2, 1992. It later signed the associated safeguards agreement in April 1995 and an additional protocol in September 2013.
Under the NLD government, Myanmar ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 21, 2016, and signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on September 16, 2018. The TPNW came into force on January 22, 2021, just days before the military coup, marking a milestone for the former civilian government.
As of November 2024, there are 180 IAEA member states. All signatories are expected to fully comply with the agency’s rules, agreements, and international standards.
The Military’s Nuclear Ambition
Looking back, Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions date back at least a quarter-century. Its secretive collaborations weren’t limited to Russia and North Korea; there is evidence that Myanmar reached out to black-market nuclear networks as well.
According to past reports, Myanmar even had contact with a country that tested a nuclear weapon before North Korea and had no direct border with Myanmar. In December 2001, The New York Times reported that two nuclear scientists from that country—Pakistan—were found to be in Myanmar at that time.
Following the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda, U.S. intelligence agencies sought to determine if terrorist groups like the Taliban or Al Qaeda were trying to obtain nuclear weapons. During that period, they began investigating two prominent Pakistani nuclear scientists, Dr. Suleiman Asad and Dr. Muhammad Ali Mukhtar. According to the report, these scientists had traveled to Myanmar shortly after 9/11, raising serious concerns.
Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in May 1998—years before North Korea’s in 2006. Then-CIA Director George Tenet traveled to Pakistan, and although the CIA did not confirm the nature of his trip, the White House later acknowledged that it was partly related to nuclear issues.
Pakistani officials eventually confirmed that Dr. Asad and Dr. Mukhtar were the scientists of interest to the CIA. These scientists had recently returned from Myanmar and were reportedly not expected to return to Pakistan anytime soon. The article noted that they were certainly not in Myanmar for an agricultural project.
This historical context, combined with the recent U.S. investigation and materials seized in the Ebisawa case, suggests that Myanmar may have sustained a secret nuclear program for years—one that included obtaining weapons-grade plutonium, a material extremely rare and difficult to acquire without a nuclear reactor.
The IAEA has no record of Myanmar operating a reactor capable of producing such material. However, the Ebisawa case and its supporting forensic evidence from nuclear labs make it difficult to refute the claim that the plutonium originated in Myanmar.
In 2012, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Myanmar’s then-defense minister, Lt. Gen. Hla Min, stated that past nuclear activities had ceased and there were no plans to resume them. He also claimed that there was nothing for the IAEA to inspect. But in hindsight, if there were truly nothing to hide, why refuse inspection?
The nuclear-related suspicions had already surfaced in international media reports between 2009 and 2010. If the government genuinely halted all activities back then, there should be no trace of them today—and certainly no chance for weapons-grade plutonium to emerge from Myanmar.
So now, the question looms large: was Myanmar’s past reassurance to the international community—and ASEAN in particular—a lie? If so, then violating the Bangkok Treaty and ASEAN’s Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty is a serious breach that cannot be dismissed.
(Part 3 – To be continued.)t.me@moemaka
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